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Abstract
The fierce debates surrounding the ‘emergence’ of Muslim communities in 
Europe ensued in the resurgence of nationalism. The current article introduces 
an original criticism to the ongoing debates surrounding the return of Europe’s 
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national pride. This article suggests that Muslim demands for freedom of religion 
that were founded in Islamic theological perspectives, have catalyzed the 
restriction of liberal universalistic perspectives to such freedoms. In this study I 
present how such demands facilitated the advancement of a newly crafted liberal 
form of nationalism, best identified in Europe’s progressing limitation of the right 
of freedom of religion in various European nations. 
Key-words: Muslims; Europe; Euro-Islam; nationalism; freedom of religion.
Resumen
Los debates acerca de la inclusión del Islam y las comunidades Musulmanes 
en Europa  han servido de marco para el resurgirmiento del nacionalismo en 
Europa. Este articulo introduce un planteamiento critico a los debates que rodean 
a este levantamiento civico nacionalista .El articulo sugiere que las exigencias de 
libertad religiosa fundadas en principios teologicos  por parte de los Musulmanes 
han catalizado una respuesta nacionalista secular que restringe el valor universal 
de las libertades liberales.   Este articulo explica como las exigencias de los 
Musulmanes ha permitido el pasaje de un liberalismo universal a un liberalismo 
nacional que se expresa en muchos paises como una limitacion a la libertad 
religiosa.
   
Palabras-clave: Islam; nationalism; liberalism; religión; Europe.
In its recent study, the Pew Research Center concluded that government 
restrictions on religion have increased more in Europe than any other region in 
the world.2 Europe’s newly introduced restrictions consist of a variety of laws, 
policies and practices that all constitute a serious infringement of the right for 
freedom of religion. As one might have expected, the community most afflicted 
by these restrictions are European Muslims. 
The emergence of Islamic terrorism and cultural radicalization in Western 
democratic societies has been, without a doubt, a dominant theme in political and 
academic debate during this last decade. One of the perplexing consequences of 
Islamic terrorism is that what was initially perceived as a battle against extremism 
has altered into a reshaping of Europe’s understanding of nationalism, and the 
drifting apart from universal perspectives of liberalism.  
The current article introduces an original addition to the ongoing debate 
about the revival of the national theme in face of the emergence of a European 
Islam. It is suggested that the dramatic developments in Europe are the result of 
a more sophisticated challenge than radicalism, advanced by a specific type of 
Euro-Islam that remains embedded in fundamental Islamist perspectives. 
2 “Rising Tide of Restrictions on Religion.” The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. Pew 
Research Center. 2012.
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The argument advanced throughout this article is that by advancing 
demands for cultural recognition based on theological concepts embedded in 
Islamic reformism and Islamism, a new brand of Muslim intellectuals attempts to 
establish a new understanding of what is means to be a Muslim, and in particular, 
a European Muslim.  In contrast with Europe’s assimilationist and isolationist 
approaches, their approach emphasizes the preservation of a visible religious 
Islamic identity and its non-liberal orientations. Thus, this realm of Muslims 
attempts to revitalize Islamist notions in a manner that challenges both Muslim 
theology and Western philosophy.3
In order to make this happen, as several researches have pointed out, 
some new brands of Euro-Islam adapted some of the classical characteristics of 
European civilization, others turned to reform their own tradition, while other 
attempted to revive old notions.4
This article makes one primary claim. It is argued that some of these 
Muslims initiatives, arguably best exemplified by the protests against Rushdie 
and the Danish caricatures and promoted by European Muslim intellectuals 
such as T. Ramadan, have formed apprehension among Western publics, which 
resulted in the resurrection of an assertive form of liberalism and the restriction 
of freedom of religion.   
In contrast to works that focus on the socioeconomic differences and 
demographic size of Europe’s Muslims as the trigger for a nationalist reaction 
in the West, this article suggests that this is better explained by the ideological 
challenge posed by Euro-Islamists to liberalism and its embedment in present 
day secularism. 
The question thus should be framed in the following manner: what is 
motivating this liberal nationalist pushback?  Is this merely a manifestation of 
racism and right-wing exclusionism?  Or is it a particularly rejection of Islam? 
Indeed, a wide variety of liberal and left-wing multiculturalists view the rising 
support for nationalist values as a clear indicator to the return of racism and 
fascism. However, for others, the European response is a retort to a peculiar 
ideology that challenges the foundations of these societies. 
In this article, I stress that a new Muslim discourse on citizenship 
advances legitimate claims for cultural recognition and religious equality. 
However, I center on the problematic ideological foundations of certain types of 
Euro-Islam, through a brief review of the case of Tariq Ramadan.  Next, I address 
the prevailing manner in which Europe restricts Muslims’ freedom of religion, as 
identified in various Western European countries, including Spain, France, Great 
Britain, The Netherlands and Switzerland.  Finally, I discuss what motivates this 
rejection of Islam. 
 
3  Ramadan, T. To be an European Muslim. (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1999), p.186.
4  Mandaville, P. Transnational Muslim Politics Re-imagining the Ummah (London: Routledge, 
2001), pp. 132-136.
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Euro-Islam(s) and Euro-Islamism 
Is this fear of Islam something new for Europeans?  In reality, it is not. 
The contemporary growing tension is enrooted in a long history of conflict between 
Europe and Islam. However, the current debate on Islam is mostly assigned to the 
millions of Muslim immigrants that arrived to Europe since the 1960s. 
The vast majority of Europe’s Muslims came as immigrant workers, 
asylum seekers, and illegal aliens. Most came as individual “guest workers” to 
supply the growing demand for manual labor after World War II. Many of these 
newcomers did not expect - and were not expected - to stay permanently. 
However, as time passed newcomers became permanent residents. The 
size of this community grew rapidly, especially under the 1970s and 1980s family 
reunification laws.5 A new and separate challenge evolved - how to administer 
the religious and cultural demands of a population that was showing particular 
difficulties in taking part in the modern secular European society.  
Initially, the adherence of Europe’s Muslims to homeland ideologies 
and theologies was perceived as desirable by European authorities. However, 
since the 90s, apprehension from such loyalties took center stage. What lead 
to these developments?  During the last decades of the 20th century European 
governments expected immigrants to keep their loyalty to their homelands. 
The underlying reason for that attitude is that governments expect newcomers 
to go back to their places of origin.  Following this line of thought, European 
governments encouraged such associations, and gave the Turkish diyanet and 
similar ministries in Algeria and the Levant a free hand in administering the needs 
of their immigrants. As a result of that approach, a type of church-state dynamic 
that is common in the Muslim world was set.  
However, beginning in the 1990s, as governments began to confront the 
reality that Muslim newcomers were to stay, governments began to sever Muslim 
communities from their transnational ties. This approach was radically intensified 
after September 11, 2001.  Even before the terrorist attacks - European governments 
began to view the needs of Muslims through the lens of security considerations.6
As a result, European governments formed new reservations regarding 
the influence of foreign Imams and homeland religious organizations in Europe. 
Europe hoped that by severing the ties between Europe’s mosques and religious 
organizations and institutions, and by the reduction of Arab states’ financing and 
influence over such, issues of loyalty would be mitigated. 
5  Carolyn M. W. and Manfred W. W. “Religion and the Political Organization of Muslims in 
Europe” Perspectives on Politics. September 2006. See also: Lewis, B. The Muslim Discovery of 
Europe. (New York: Norton, 1982). 
6   Laurence, J.  “Managing Transnational Islam: Muslims and the State in Western Europe.” in: 
Parsons, C., and Smeeding, T. M. (eds.) Immigration and the Transformation of Europe. (New York 
and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Haddad Y. and Golson, T. “Overhauling Islam 
Representation, Construction, and Cooption of “Moderate Islam” in Western Europe”, J. Church and 
St. 2007. pp. 487- 515
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Europe’s new approach to Muslim institutions in Europe facilitated 
various changes. European based- Muslim organizations took root, and it seemed 
that a Euro-Islam was emerging. However, in reality, there were many Euro-
Islams. The new associations expressed dramatically different approaches to 
Islamic theology, homeland policies and European societies and governments. 
European Muslims also greatly differ in their religious traditions 
and practices, generally influenced by the variations in religious, cultural and 
traditional beliefs and homeland customs. These distinctions form different 
approaches to religious duties, such as the observance of halal foods (the Islamic 
specific dietary requirements), women’s wearing of the headscarf, and the 
participation in the Salah (Islam’s five daily prayers). For example, a study by 
the Pew research center found that about half of the Spanish, British and German 
Muslim women wore the headscarf. Among French Muslim women, less than 
one seventh chose to do so.7 Most importantly, there are extensive and crucial 
differences in the manner in which such Euro-Islams approach the disadvantaged 
position of the community, and envision very different roles for Muslims in their 
European societies. 
It can not be overlooked that for the new, young generation of right-
bearing Muslims, Europe is their natural home, despite the fact that they feel 
discriminated and marginalized in it. It is clear that this new generation seeks for 
recognition and equality in this challenging environment.8 However, the different 
manners in which equality and recognition were defined and advanced were of 
major importance for European publics and authorities.   
In this regard, one of the main question Europeans wonder about 
is what stands behind these emerging Muslim associations in Europe. Is it 
something intrinsic in Islam that drives Muslims to their vehement demand for 
public accommodation? Or do Muslims basically react to the discrimination and 
socioeconomic deprivation they encounter?9 
While Europeans cannot deny that Muslims face discrimination at the 
socioeconomic level, in general terms, they explain that the increasing social 
mistrust of Muslims is due to the fact that they are perceived as non-loyal citizens 
ready to mobilize along transnational Islamic lines. In other words, what became 
crucial for Europe is that for some of the new representatives of this Euro-Islam, 
the defense of the Umma stands above the loyalty to Europe’s liberal values.10   
7  Morin, R. and Menasce-Horowitz J. “Europeans debate the scarf and the veil.” Global attitudes 
Project. Pew Research Center. November 20, 2006.
8   See: Klausen, J.  The Islamic Challenge. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 25. 
9   See, Statham, P. “New Conflicts about Integration and Cultural Diversity in Britain,” in: Cuperus, 
R. Duffeck K.A. and Kandel, J. (eds). The Challenge of Diversity: European Social Democracy 
Facing Migration, Integration, and Multiculturalism (Studienverlag, Innsbruck, 2003). See: Samad, 
Y. “The Politics of Islamic Identity among Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in Britain”, in: Ranger, T. 
Samad, Y. and Stuart, O. (eds). Culture Identity and Politics: Ethnic Minorities in Britain, (Aldershot, 
Avebury, 1996)
10  See: Zubaida, S. “Islam and nationalism: continuities and contradictions.” Nations and Nationalism, 
10(4), 2004, 407, Cited in: Mortimer, E. Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam (London: Faber, 1982), p.271. 
110 Alberto Spektorowski
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 16, nº 31. Primer semestre de 2014. 
Pp. 105-126.
Can Euro-Islam assign to liberalism?
Questions pertaining to the synchronization of Euro-Islam to liberal 
Europe depend greatly on the manner in which this Islam is defined. A variety of 
scholars and figures, with dramatically different approaches, have tried to become 
the voice of this Euro-Islam. Bassam Tibi, Tariq Moddod, Malek Chebel, as well 
as Amr Khaled and Y. Qaradawi perceive themselves as the representatives of this 
new Euro-Islam.  
Although they promote dramatically different perspectives, they all try 
to contribute in defining the particular relation of Islam with Europe, and thus, 
provide different answers to Islam’s relation to liberalism.  
The most challenging position, however, is presented by Tariq Ramadan. 
This Swiss philosopher and Muslim intellectual is the grandson of Hassan al 
Banna, the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Ramadan’s enchantment 
with Islamic reformism has made him a highly contentious figure, and a primary 
source of concern for European governments. For his followers, he is a figure 
that represents a reformed and more enlightened Islam, but for most of Europe’s 
authorities, he is perceived as a wolf in sheep’s clothing. 
What is in agreement is that Ramadan advocates and promotes the 
development of an independent Western Islam, which takes into account the 
cultural differences of present day Europe.  Thus, in Ramadan’s vision European 
Muslims, just like Asian or African Muslims, should read the Koran and interpret 
it in light of their own cultural background. 
However, some of Ramadan’s positions are disturbing to Europe. Indeed, 
Ramadan is highly familiar with the Western liberal discourse, however not fully 
endorsing all of its views, as one might sense from his books, To Be a European 
Muslim and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. What is troubling for most 
is not the critic itself, as much as the fact that the critique comes from an Islamist 
standpoint. Even more concerning is that, in Ramadan’s views, by endorsing a 
more culturally adaptable form of Islam, he believes he promotes the cultivation 
of a new Islam that will proof itself as a viable alternative to liberalism.  He argues 
that the adherence to a ‘foreign’ Islam contributes to European Muslims’ sense of 
inferiority and alienation from European culture. 
Europe’s primary concerns are whether Ramadan truly brakes away 
from the more rigid Islamic conservative positions, or utilizes a sophisticated use 
of euphemisms. 
One the one hand, Tariq Ramadan challenges classical jurisprudential 
concepts. 
Ramadan rejects the classical binary division of the world into dar al-
islam (abode of peace: Muslim countries) and dar al-harb (abode of war: all other 
countries) and calls to revise such outdated concepts and the adoption of the term 
dar al-shahada  (the abode of proclamation/testimony). For Ramadan, the West 
111An exclusionist Europe? Islam and the reemergence of civic nationalism
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 16, nº 31. Primer semestre de 2014. 
Pp. 105-126.
is neither the ‘abode of war’ nor the ‘abode of peace’, but dar al-shahada, thus, 
the abode of testimony of Islam. 
Ramadan’s beliefs track many of those of Y. Qaradawi and Faysal 
Mawlawi who define Europe as the “Abode of Proselytizing” (dar al-da’wa). 
However, Ramadan claims to be less conservative than such scholars of Islam 
since he is more open to integration, as long as Muslims will continue to be loyal 
to Islam and the advancement of its message.  
Still, like Qaradawi, and in contrast to progressive Islamic thinkers such 
as Mohammed Taleb or Malek Chebel, Ramadan adopts the language of da’wa, 
which troubles Europeans since it entails the conversion of non-Muslims and the 
ultimate Islamization of the West. 11 
The central apprehension of critics is that, while speaking about 
accommodation and reform, Ramadan’s ultimate aim is to change Europe, rather 
than accept it or recognize the liberal legacy that established it.12 
Muslims and non-Muslim scholars have expressed their concerns about 
Ramadan’s theological argumentations. Scholars such as Caroline Fourest, who 
analyzed Ramadan’s works, has noted that his views are inherently developments 
of his grandfathers’ (Hassan al-Banna) work which evolved into various 
contentious and violent form of Islam, including the global jihadist movement.13 
Bassam Tibi argues that Ramadan’s use of Salafi concepts to advance Islamization 
stands as proof to his inherent anti-liberal views. 14  
European governments and public figures have expressed similar 
concerns. Nicolas Sarkozy has accused Ramadan of defending the inhumane 
practices advanced under the Islamic penal code (hudud), the former head of 
the French organization SOS Racisme, Malek Boutih, has referred to Ramadan 
as a ‘fascist’ and a ‘small Le Pen’, and Bertrand Delanoë, mayor of Paris, 
and Dominique Sopo, head of SOS-Racisme, have all charged Ramadan of 
propagating anti-Semitic views. Daniel Pipes has accused Ramadan of having 
ties with Islamic extremist movements. In September 2006, the US government 
formally denied Ramadan’s visa application since it concluded that Dr. Ramadan 
was inadmissible since he allegedly provided material support to a terrorist 
organization (a ruling later reversed in 2009). 
In Europe and the US, authorities and scholars continue to perceive 
Ramadan as a somewhat unwelcome figure. Somewhat ironically, however, in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Syria, he has also been declared as a 
11   Ramadan. T. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), p.73.
12  See: Kepel, G. Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe. (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1997). See also: Kepel, G. The War for Muslim Minds. Islam and the West. (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2004). 
13  Fourest, C. Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan. [English translation of Frère 
Tariq: Discours, stratégie et méthode de Tariq Ramadan]. (New York: Encounter Books, 2008) 
14  Tibi, B. “Europeanization, not Islamization”,  Sign and sight, (website), Published online on 
March 22, 2007. At: www.signandsight.com
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persona non-grata due to his critic against the undemocratic practices of these 
countries. 
In response to many of such claims, Ramadan responded that most 
Europeans have deserted their commitment to human rights. This accusation was 
presented to a variety of European scholars and public figures, including French 
intellectuals such as Alexandre Adler, Alain Finkielkraut, Bernard-Henri Lévy, 
André Glucksmann and Bernard Kouchner. 
Indeed, the universalistic approach to liberalism stresses human dignity 
and recognizes and respects religious and cultural differences. According to this 
perspective, Ramadan’s views are sustainable. 
However, as will be presented, Europe is increasingly distancing itself 
from this approach. 
The limitation of freedom of religion in Western Europe 
For better or worse, treating Islam as a cultural or religious “partenaire,” 
or shareholder, seems to challenges the national identities of European societies 
as those societies perceive them. Despite the differences between Scandinavean 
countries and Britain, which have a national church, to France which defends 
laïcité, none is ready to recognize Islam as ‘equal’ parteniare.  
The most prominent characteristic of this newly crafted assertive liberal 
nationalism is the progressing willingness to restrict freedom of religion. As 
will be presented in this section, across various Western European countries, 
authorities and publics express their disengagement from the values of universal 
liberal approach to human rights, mainly in regard to the freedom and equality 
of religion. 
The most notable indication of this trend is that Muslims, unlike other 
religious groups in Europe, encounter great obstacles when trying to introduce 
Muslim symbols and places of worship to Europe’s public spheres.   
The classic human rights to religious liberty and freedom are enshrined 
by national constitutions and laws and international conventions and declarations. 
Several international human rights treaties specifically prohibit discrimination 
on the ground of Religion or belief, including Article 2.1 in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 2.2 in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and Article 2 in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 
The protection of freedom of religion has also been integrated into 
European legislations. Article 14 in the European Convention on Human Rights, 
(ECHR) prohibits its affiliated nations from discriminating on the ground of 
religion, and has introduced a free-standing anti-discrimination clause that 
specifically bans discrimination on the ground of religion in regard to all legal 
rights. The European Social Charter (ESC) protects the rule of non-discrimination 
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on the ground of religion in various regards, as well as in the field of employment, 
education and health. Article 21 of The Charter on Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union proscribes any form of discrimination on the ground of religion 
or faith. 
Nevertheless, the rejection of Islam has been fierce, as publics and 
parliaments across Europe expressed their clear refusal to grant Islam any further 
recognition in the public sphere through various expressions and legislations. In 
France (2010) and the Netherlands (2012), governments banned the wearing of 
the full face veil (often referred to as the burqa ban). In 2009, Switzerland banned 
the building of minarets.
Such legislations delivered over a clear message to Europe’s Muslims: 
that is, that European publics and governments were not ready and willing to 
grant Muslims and Islam further recognition.  
There were various social and political developments that preceded 
these legislations. In England, after the Northern England racial unrest of 2001, 
the British public was alarmed by the extent and pervasiveness of ethnic tensions. 
In the Netherlands, the murder of the filmmaker, Theo Van Gogh, by a young 
Dutch-born Muslim, shocked the nation.  In France, following the rebellion in 
the banlieues in 2005, public expressed greater support for the affirmation of 
Republican values. Such events, in addition to the disturbing discoveries on 
terrorist plots, amalgamated the need to define the role religion, and Islam in 
particular, should have in these modern democracies.   
Only a minute percent of Muslim women in Europe wear the burqa. In 
France, for example, it assumed that less than two thousand Muslim women wear 
the burqa. In the Netherlands, it is assumed that no more than 400 women wear the 
veil.15 Nevertheless, in recent years there have been numerous attempts to prohibit 
the wearing of full-face veils in several European countries, including Austria, 
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
 In June 2009, the National Assembly (Lower Chamber of the French 
Parliament) set up a Commission to investigate the extent of the wearing of 
full-face veils in France. The Commission found that the practice was marginal, 
yet at times resulting from community pressure to comply with certain norms. 
Nevertheless, the French proceeded with the legislation which entered into 
force in 2011. Under the French law, full face concealment can not be worn in 
public, including in religious institutions. A similar ban has been adopted in the 
Netherlands in 2012 and in Belgium, in which a vast majority of parliament 
members voted in favor of the face-veil ban, which entered into force in 2011. 
Even though such bans are generally promoted under considerations 
pertaining to security, in countries such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands and 
15   See: “Report on the wearing of full-face veils on the national territory”, National Assembly, 
January 2010, p. 28; See: Moors, A. “The Dutch and the veil: the politics of discomfort”, Social 
Anthropology, 2009, pp. 393-408.
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Spain, domestic legislation already provided law enforcement agents with the 
power to undertake identity checks. 
While the bans are generally designed in a neutral fashion, it is patently 
clear that they were fashioned for the case of Muslim women. As explained by 
the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg: 
“The fact that the public discussion in a number of European countries has almost 
exclusively focused on what is perceived as Muslim dress has been unfortunate 
and created the impression of targeting one particular religion.”16
Similar developments are noted in the field of the construction of 
mosques. The UN Human Rights Committee has declared that “Places of worship 
are an essential element of the manifestation of the right to freedom of religion”, 
and therefore called to recognize that this requires “the existence of a place of 
worship”. In its statements and reports, the UN has noted that restrictions put 
on the access to worship may be considered as a broad violation of the right for 
freedom since it violates “the right not only of a single individual, but the rights 
of a group of individuals forming the community that is attached to the place in 
question.”17 
Despite that restricting Muslims’ access to places of worship would be 
a clear violation of such European and nationally embedded constitutional rights, 
various European countries have expressed their willingness to infringe the right 
for freedom of religion when it comes to Muslims. 
A dramatic example of such developments took place in Switzerland, in 
which the building of mosques has been subject to legal and political controversy 
since 2005. In 2007, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and the Federal Democratic 
Union (FDU) launched an initiative aimed at introducing a ban on minarets, 
which entailed the amendment of the Swiss Constitution. The initiative was 
signed by over 100 thousand citizens and then presented to the Swiss Parliament. 
The Swiss Federal Council (Swiss government) informed the Federal Assembly 
that the initiative may be perceived as a violation of the right to freedom of 
religion, as presented in the European Convention on Human Rights. However, 
the Committee against the Building of Minarets argued that minarets were not a 
manifestation of religion but a political statement. Thus, the initiative was found 
valid and presented to a referendum vote, although the Assembly recommended 
to vote against the ban. 
In November 2009, more than half of the voters expressed support to 
the ban. All but four of the 26 Cantons (Geneva, Vaud, Neuchâtel and Basel City) 
voted in favor of it. As a result of the referendum, a third point was added to Article 
72 of the Federal Constitution, which currently states that; “1) The regulation of 
the relation between the Church and the State is a competence of the Cantons. 2) 
16  Commissioner’s Viewpoint, 8 March 2010.
17  See: “General Comment No. 22”. Human Rights Committee. Also see: Jahangir, A. “Civil and 
political rights”, UN Special Report on the right to freedom of religion or belief. December 20, 2004, 
E/CN.4/2005/61.
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Within the boundaries of their respective competences, the Confederation and 
the Cantons can adopt measures aimed at maintaining peace among members of 
different religious communities. 3) The building of minarets is forbidden.” 
Swiss authorities have acknowledged the problematic nature of the 
referendum. The consistency between the current prohibition, enshrined by the 
Constitution and the European Convention could be assessed by the Federal 
Tribunal, which is required to execute international law. Following the conclusions 
of two Federal Council reports, which were formulated to attend the potential 
collision between constitutional and European and international laws, both 
Chambers of the Swiss Parliament supported a motion mandating the government 
to formulate a proposal outlining the legal rational by which this reform could 
overcome such challenges, while maintaining its primary prohibition. 
No other European country has gone as far as Switzerland, which can 
not escape its blatant and discriminating limitation of Muslims’ freedom of 
religion. However, all across Western Europe, Muslims face various challenges 
in the establishment of places of worship. In Britain, the Netherlands, Germany 
and France, Muslim communities also seek relief for their overcrowded places of 
worship, with little success. 
Even in countries in which there seems to be a greater willingness to 
recognize the role of religion, and Islam in particular, mosque construction is 
accompanied by great controversies. 
Spain, for example, specifies the right to freedom of religion and the 
establishment of places of worship. In 2009, the Catalan adopted a more specific 
regulation, requiring municipalities to take into consideration in urban the planning 
communal needs, including the need to allocate space to places of worship.18 Still, 
in Catalan, the mere attempt to establish Muslim places of worship has resulted 
in severe disputes between local residents, Muslims and municipal authorities.19 
Catalan authorities have openly declared that the establishment of Muslim places 
of worship is generally accompanied by great apprehension and protest by local 
citizens due to fear from Islam.20 In several cases these protests were endorsed by 
parties who have a clear anti-Islam agenda such as Platform for Catalonia (PxC). 
Europe’s reluctance to ensure freedom of religion is also noted in the 
field of education. The wearing of religious symbols in educational institutions 
has been an issue of controversy in numerous European countries, including 
Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
International law permits certain restrictions to be placed on this right in regard 
to educational institutions, providing that certain provisions are met. Heiner 
18  Article 4 of Law 16/2009. Decree 94/2010 of 20 July elaborates on Article 4.
19  Moreras, J. “Una mesquita al barri, conflicte, espai públic i inserción urbana dels oratoris 
musulmans a Catalunya”. 2009, p. 52.
20  See: “Meeting with the DG Religious Affairs, Generalitat de Catalunya, 6 July 2011. Meeting 
with DG Immigration, Generalitat de Catalunya, 13 January 2011”, cited in: “Choice and prejudice. 
Discrimination against Muslims in Europe”. Amnesty. London, 2012, p. 85. 
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Bielefeldt, the UN Special Reporter on freedom of religion has noted that the 
fundamental assumption should rest on the understanding that pupils have the 
right to wear religious symbols in their educational institutions,21 and that any 
restrictions should be fashioned and applied in a non-discriminatory manner. 
In Belgium, the concept of neutrality in education is protected by 
the Constitution in Article 24.1, aimed to insure the respect for the religious, 
ideological and political beliefs of both pupils and their parents. Despite that 
the concept of neutrality, as presented in Belgian and international law, is to be 
interpreted in a manner that protects diversity and pupils’ basic right to wear 
religious symbols, many Belgian schools adopted internal regulations prohibiting 
the wearing of such symbols.  
The development and adoption of such prohibitions emerged following 
controversies about the wearing of head scarves by Muslim girls, while the 
wearing of other symbols was generally accepted. In 2009, the Board of Education 
of the Flemish Community (GO!), which is tasked to provide neutral and non-
denominational education, introduced a ban that prohibits the wearing of religious 
and cultural symbols by pupils and teachers. Belgian Muslims claim that they are 
affected more by this ban than other religious or cultural groups. Catholics and 
Jews generally wear religious symbols in their denominational schools, due to 
the extremely low number of Muslim private schools, Muslim pupils are forced 
to chose between home-schooling, compliance with the ban, or the relocation 
to schools of other denominations, which are legally capable of prohibiting the 
wearing of religious symbols that do not comply with the institution’s religious 
view. 
France adopted a similar ban to the wearing of religious symbols 
in educational institutions in 2004. In response, in 2007, the UN Independent 
Expert on minority issues noted that the “… 2004 on ‘laïcité’ and the wearing of 
conspicuous religious symbols in public schools constitutes a limitation of the 
right to manifest a religion or a belief … and has mainly affected certain religious 
minorities, and notably, people of a Muslim background.”22
As noted, European states and institutions are reluctant to address the 
violations of Muslims’ right to freedom of religion, even in countries where such 
discrimination is prohibited under national laws. 
Another contentious field, which concerns both Muslims and Jews is 
the dietary one. For example the the president-elect of the British Veterinary 
Association (BVA) John Blackwell said he wanted to discuss the issue of halal 
and kosher food with Jewish and Muslim groups in order to find a compromise 
that puts more emphasis on the welfare of the animal.   This saga comes as an 
echo to debates in different European countries, especially in Denmark whose 
21  “Report of the UN Special Reporter on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt”. HRC, 
December 2010. 
22  “Report on the Independent Expert on Minority Issues, Mission to France (19–28 September 
2007)”, HRC, March 2008.
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government has brought in a ban on the religious slaughter of animals for the 
production of halal and kosher meat, after years of campaigning from welfare 
activists. The minister for agriculture and food Dan Jørgensen told Denmark’s 
TV2 that “animal rights come before religion”. 23
Of no question, while the debate focuses on Muslims, the new initiatives 
against freedom of religion of Muslims affect also Jews. The other case in point 
is the debate around circumcision. The debate in its origins was related to female 
circumcision however, it did not take long till it drifted to male circumcision.  
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) for 
example held a debate on circumcision in Strasbourg, France, in accordance with 
a resolution recognizing circumcision as a violation of bodily integrity and calling 
for public discussion on the matter.  Before that resolution, a seemingly insignificant 
decision by a lower court in Cologne against a doctor who circumcised a Muslim 
boy, has triggered a spreading drive to criminalize a religious practice that is at 
the heart of Jewish and Muslim belief. Of no question, the dispute reflects the ever 
deeper liberalization of European life that, in the eyes of some religious leaders, 
has mutated into a form of intolerance. 24
Although the impact of the extending discriminatory practices is also 
affecting Jews, it must be stressed that it had a heavy impact on European Muslims, 
because in more sense than one, religious discrimination is accompanied by 
economic discrimination.  
For example, according to a 2010 survey conducted by the Open Society 
Institute, Muslims were victims of religious and racial discrimination more 
often than non-Muslims, especially in the fields of employment and education.25 
In its recent reports, the European Network Against Racism announced that 
Islamophobia is prevalent in all European societies, specifically affecting Muslims 
in the areas of employment, education and access to goods and services. 
Statistics bear proof to the harsh socioeconomic reality of the Muslims 
communities. In numerous European countries, Muslims have strikingly higher 
levels of unemployment in comparison to the ‘native’ population, but also other 
ethnic and religious minorities residing in such nations.26  A study by the Institute 
for the Study of Labour on the position of ethnic minorities in Europe’s labour 
market revealed that the participation rate among groups that are predominantly 
Muslim (Turks, Moroccans, Iraqis, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) is lower than 
that of the majority population. It noted that such Muslim minorities “typically 
have significantly higher unemployment rates, lower labour income, and they are 
23  Withnall A. “Denmark bans kosher and halal slaughter as minister says ‘animal rights come 
before religion”,   The Independent. Friday, March 7, 2014.
24  Ewing J. “Some Religious Leaders See a Threat as Europe Grows More Secular,” New York 
Times September 19, 2012.
25  “Muslims in Europe 2010: A report on 11 cities”, Open Society Foundation, pp. 84-85, p.101.
26  “Les immigrés en France,” INSEE. Paris. édition 2005; “Documenting discrimination against 
migrant workers in the labour market,” ILO. Geneva. 2000. At: www.ilo.org
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less likely to find and keep their jobs than the majority population.”27
Discrimination on the ground of religion manifests in various ways in the 
private and public sectors.  In Belgium’s private sector, for example, companies 
are allowed to set restrictions on the wearing of religious symbols which may put-
off clients. Banks and other service-providing companies operating in Belgium 
have applied such restrictions, which generally centered on the demand of their 
Muslim employees to remove their religious symbols and/ or scarves.28 
However, attempts to extend further protection to Muslims in the field of 
employment have failed. European Union anti-discrimination Directives provides 
only partial protection against different forms of discrimination. Although that 
the Race Directive (2000/43/EC) demands member-states to ban discrimination 
on the ground of race in various fields, the Framework Employment Directive 
(2000/78/EC) bans discrimination on the ground of religion only in the field of 
employment. Recognizing the problematical partiality in the Directive’s ability to 
assure freedom of religion in all areas, in 2008 the European Commission initiated 
a proposal for a new anti-discrimination Directive aimed to extent the protection 
against discrimination on the grounds of religion (and other orientations) in the 
areas of access to goods and services, education, social protection and social 
advantages.  However, there is no consensus among European member states on 
the need to advance such extended anti-discrimination legislation.
It is patently clear that when European countries are faced by demands 
to allocate the protection of freedom of religion to the case of Islam, debates can 
not avoid returning to fundamental questions pertaining to the state – religion 
relationship, even when such are concealed under the notion of secularism or 
neutrality. 
The question is what has caused this reaction? Is modern secular ideology 
inherently antagonistic towards religion? Or is Islam, as European publics often 
claim, inherently incompatible and incapable of accepting Europe’s traditional 
state-religion arrangements?
The resurgence of liberal nationalism 
Undeniably, the arrangements between Christianity and the state, which 
are notable across various secular European countries, could serve as a path 
way for the incorporation of Islam.29 However, there is a clear unwillingness 
27  Zimmerman K. F. et al. “Study on the Social and Labour Market Integration of Ethnic 
Minorities”. IZA Research Report. No 16, 2008. p. 11
28  Adam, I. and Rea, A. “La diversité culturelle sur le lieu de travail.” Pratiques d’aménagements 
raisonnables, Centre pour l’Egalité des Chances et la lutte contre le racisme (CECLR). 2010.
29   For example, according to the 1988 General Comment of the UN Human Rights committee 
different religious traditions can legitimately be allocated special recognition by authorities, providing 
that such will not interfere with other individual religious freedoms or constitute any discrimination 
against members of other religious or ideological groups. See: Boyle, K. and Sheen, J. (eds.) Freedom 
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to accommodate Muslims into such existing arrangements, which creates an 
even more tensed atmosphere.  A variety of scholars have tried to explain why 
Europe’s retort has centralized on the affirmation of liberalism as against its 
Muslim citizens. 
Casanova argues that when Europe is faced with such Muslim requests, 
the liberal and illiberal facets of European secularism are revealed. Casanova 
concludes that “problem of religion in relation to democracy may not be a real 
problem intrinsic to religion itself, but rather a problem linked to widespread 
secularist assumptions about religion, democracy and their relationships”.30 For 
Casanova, thus, the challenge is not Islam per-se, but a new secularist ideology 
that aims to marginalize, if not eliminate, its old rivals. 
In a similar vein, Jocelyne Cesari argues that the main challenges in 
present European societies stem out of the assignment of negative and violent 
stereotypes to religion under a secularist ideology, and not religion. Thus, for 
Cesari, the conflicts result out of the emergence of secular ideologies, and not 
Islamic ones. 31 
Silvio Ferrari presents a different understanding of this challenge. For 
Ferrari, current controversies result out of the challenges both Muslims and 
Europeans have in understanding the state-religion relations. He notes that this 
misconstrued relationship poses difficulties, “on the one hand, for the Muslims 
themselves who have to find a means of integration in a (secular) reality that is 
culturally alien to many of them, and on the other, for the Europeans who have to 
understand how far the secularity of the state can go in integrating this reality.”32
Indeed, both sides of this debate present a certain unwillingness to 
reform their primary understandings. The views of Tariq Ramadan and other 
popular Muslim preachers are clearly not in line with Europe’s understanding 
of liberalism. For example, according to Ramadan, the reason women should be 
veiled is that “men are the weaker of the two and because the way men look at 
women is much more fragile than the reverse. This veil is a protection for the 
weakest of the two.” Furthermore, Ramadan advocates a form of modesty that 
is based on rather problematical responsibility in regard to women’s control 
over men’s perceptions. He suggest that if women “attract men’s look by your 
forms, your perfume, your appearance or your gestures  you are not taking a 
spiritual path.”33 
of Religion and Belief: A World Report. (London: Routledge, 1997), p. XXII. 
30  Casanova, J. “The problem of religion and the anxieties of European secular democracies.” in: 
Motzkin, G., and Fischer, Y., (eds.) Religion and Democracy in Contemporary Europe. (Alliance 
publishing trust, 2008), p.63. 
31  See: McLougin S., and Cesari J., European Muslims and the secular state. (Ashgate Publishing, 
2005).
32  Ferrari, S. “The secularity of the state and the shaping of Muslim representative organizations in 
western Europe.” in: McLougin S., and Cesari J., European Muslims and the secular state. (Ashgate 
Publishing, 2005), p.12.
33  Fourest, C. Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan….op.cita, p.162. 
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The central point is, that according to Ramadan’s understanding 
of Islamic obligations, all individual choices are subject to the perceptions of 
what Fourest referred to, as a ‘communitarian concept of culture’.34 From this 
perspective, there is no individual choice, but only collective obligations, which 
become dependant on the community’s stance. 
Europe has long departed from such understandings of culture while 
taking great pride in its commitment to liberalism. In the eyes of many European, 
Muslims have not, or not yet, affirmed their commitment to the basic liberal 
premises. However, behind this assumption, what can be concluded is that it is very 
difficult to disentangle Europe’s liberal identity from its Christian background, as 
suggested by Joppke.35  Christianity does not imply religiosity but it represents 
instead a particular historical-cultural reality.  
It can not be overlooked that European societies generally sense 
that they have already solved the state-religion dilemma by choosing to 
adopt the liberal secular norm that demands the privatization of religion. A 
widespread feeling in European societies is that Islam has inherent problems 
with respecting the state-religion arrangements, putting forward questions 
on the essential link of the notion of secularism itself to Christianity and its 
embedment in Western culture. 
Indeed, few can argue with the fact that secularism is a distinctively 
Western creation and a primary component in the development of European and 
American nations and states.36 From a global perspective, it is also seen a primary 
component in the development and adoption of democratic practices as part of the 
manner in which such countries handled the tensions embedded in the relations 
between liberal, non-liberal and illiberal communities.  
The promotion of a Euro-Islamic discourse, which assigns superior 
importance to the loyalty to a transnational religious community by relying on 
Islamist notions, is perceived as a clear infringement of Europe’s longstanding 
approach to state-religion relations.37 Europe’s encounter with a form of Islam 
that challenges this alliance catalyzes the need to reaffirm such historical 
commitments, and therefore, distance itself from the universal approach to 
liberalism. As this article has shown, it is precisely because that the universalistic 
approach to freedom of religion accommodates the views of Islamist notions that 
Europe decided to reaffirm its alliance with a nationalistic type of liberalism. 
One of the questions scholars attempt to deal with is whether liberalism 
or liberal society can fit Islam. Some liberal scholars are reluctant to consider 
Islam as incompatible with democracy. Noah Feldman, for example, argues that 
34  Fourest, C. ibid, p.202. 
35  Joppke, C. “A Christian Identity in a Liberal State?,” The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 64. 
2003, p. 612.
36  Shakman, S.H. The politics of secularism in International relations. (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), p. 23.
37  Zubaida , S. “Islam and nationalism…”…op.cita, p. 407. 
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the concept of Sharia represents the idea of constitutional justice.38 Thus, for such 
scholars, Western and Islamic concepts of justice can be compatible.
However, it is of no question that in order to coexist with Islam, Western 
liberalism should shift from color blind liberalism to a liberalism that understands 
differences. As noted by Tariq Modood, the growth of Islam in Europe calls for an 
expansion of the liberal model for coping with the understanding of racism.  The 
concept of racism must be stretched in order to include under the concept those 
that attack religious values.39  Scholars such as Andrew March, suggest that we 
have to shift from a principled liberalism to a Rawlsian overlapping consensus 
between different concepts of the good. That might, according to March, lead to 
a moderate Islamic acceptance of partnership in Western society.40   In the same 
vein, under an overlapping consensus, Islamic religious values can be included 
as part of western democratic society. If that happens, Islam would be protected 
under anti-discrimination laws.      
Indeed, one interpretation of anti-discrimination implies protection of 
cultural or religious groups that have been victimized by the majority society. 
In more sense that one, multiculturalism, and a complementary overlapping 
consensus seem to be the best strategy for that purpose. It implies a shift from 
color blind to color conscious policies. The underlying notion is preserving the 
particularism of minority groups.  However,  this is not the only meaning of anti 
discrimination.  Indeed other definitions of anti-discrimination are universalistic, 
attempting to make minority groups invisible.41 This implies moving from 
identity into the world of interests, and from equality of differences to the 
hegemony of the majoritarian national culture which guarantees the protection 
of individual autonomy.
 In that sense, a national culture appears as the basis protecting indivi-
dual autonomous rights from ethnic or religious communitarian pressure.   The 
question however, is how religious groups should react to state’s demands aga-
inst religious practices. Whether they can hold democratic arguments against it. 
 Indeed,  religious groups like Muslims might be demanding the secular 
majority to accept exemptions for their religion under the reason of achieving a 
certain egalitarianism vis-à-vis the dominant culture. If we take in account that 
majorities enact laws in order to accommodate their own religious practices, 
then it would sound fair that minorities demand such exemptions.42
38  Feldman, N. The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State.  (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2008), pp. 20-21.
39  Modood, T. “Muslims and the Politics of Difference”, The Political Quarterly. Vol. 74. Issue 1. 
January 2004, p. 109.
40  March, A. “Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in Non-Muslim Liberal Democracies,” 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 2, May 2007, p.235. 
41  Joppke, C. “Minority Rights for Immigrants? Multiculturalism vs. Antidiscrimination.” Israel 
Law Review. Vol. 43. No.1. 2010, p. 54.   
42  White, S. “Religious Exemptions:  An Egalitarian Demand?”  The Law and Ethics of Human 
Rights. Vol. 6 Issue 1, 2012, p.101
122 Alberto Spektorowski
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 16, nº 31. Primer semestre de 2014. 
Pp. 105-126.
However, in opposition to these view, what we are witnessing in Europe 
nowadays is the affirmation of a restrictive approach to freedom of religion and 
a tendency to disallow exemptions on base of religion. That suggests that the 
concept of anti-discrimination does not include protection of religious values, that 
are perceived as challenging the autonomy  of the individual.  Even when freedom 
of religion is affirmed and respected by the European Court of Human Rights,  it 
is quite clear that the European Union is reluctant to punish violators. In other 
words, the nation serves as a protection of individual rights from communitarian 
claims. 
In short, the defense of a public morality against burqas and of the 
individual rights against religious communities is what Europe stands for today. 
As is noted by Christian Joppke, European societies are abandoning the ideas 
of diversity tolerance and equal treatment, towards a more austere version 
of liberalism-as-autonomy. This version of liberalism fits the idea of liberal 
nationalism and a liberal individualistic  concept of anti-discrimination.  
In sum, I can conclude that the Muslim challenge in Europe has the set 
the path for the resurrection of a liberal form of nationalism and of a principled 
liberalism as against group rights. 
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